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Neural Substrates of Action Event Knowledge
Abstract
Human concepts can be roughly divided into entities (prototypically referred to in language by nouns) and
events (prototypically referred to in language by verbs). While much work in cognitive neuroscience has
investigated how the brain represents different categories of entities, less attention has been given to the
more basic distinction between entities and events. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to
examine brain activity while subjects performed a conceptual matching task that required them to access
knowledge of objects and actions, using either pictures or words. Since action events involve movement
through space, we hypothesized that accessing knowledge of actions would cause greater activation in
brain regions involved in motion or spatial processing. In comparison to objects, accessing knowledge of
actions through pictures was accompanied by increased activity bilaterally in the human MT/MST and
nearby regions of the lateral temporal cortex. Accessing knowledge of actions through words activated
areas just anterior and dorsal to area MT/MST on the left, within the posterior aspect of the middle and
superior temporal gyri. We propose that the lateral occipital temporal cortex contains a mosaic of neural
regions that processes different kinds of motion, ranging from the perception of objects moving in the
world to the conception of movement implied in action verbs. The lateral occipital temporal cortex
mediates the perceptual and conceptual features of action events, similar to the way that the ventral
occipital temporal cortex processes the perceptual and conceptual features of entities.
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Neural Substrates of Action Event Knowledge
Joseph W. Kable, Jessica Lease-Spellmeyer, and Anjan Chatterjee

Abstract
& Human concepts can be roughly divided into entities
(prototypically referred to in language by nouns) and events
(prototypically referred to in language by verbs). While much
work in cognitive neuroscience has investigated how the brain
represents different categories of entities, less attention has
been given to the more basic distinction between entities and
events. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to
examine brain activity while subjects performed a conceptual
matching task that required them to access knowledge of
objects and actions, using either pictures or words. Since
action events involve movement through space, we hypothesized that accessing knowledge of actions would cause greater
activation in brain regions involved in motion or spatial
processing. In comparison to objects, accessing knowledge of

INTRODUCTION
Human concepts (and the words that refer to them)
seem to fall into a manageable and consistent set of
categories. A fundamental conceptual distinction is between the categories of entities and events. Entities are
things such as people, animals, and objects, and are
prototypically referred to in language by nouns. Events
are what happens to things, including actions (spatial
and temporal changes to entities), prototypically referred to in language by verbs, and thematic relationships (who does what to whom), prototypically referred
to in language by the syntactic location of nouns.
That human concepts seem to fall into distinct categories suggests that the brain may represent these
categories differently. Cognitive neuroscientists have
considered this possibility over the past 25 years. Most
of this work has focused on how the brain represents
different categories of concrete entities (Gainotti, Silveri, Daniele, & Giustolisi, 1995). For example, brain
damage may produce the selective disruption of knowledge about living things or animate objects (Caramazza
& Shelton, 1998; Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1997;
Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Hart, Berndt, & Caramazza,
1985; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). Though less common, brain damage may also produce the reverse
dissociation, loss of knowledge about man-made arti-
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actions through pictures was accompanied by increased
activity bilaterally in the human MT/MST and nearby regions
of the lateral temporal cortex. Accessing knowledge of actions
through words activated areas just anterior and dorsal to area
MT/MST on the left, within the posterior aspect of the middle
and superior temporal gyri. We propose that the lateral
occipital – temporal cortex contains a mosaic of neural regions
that processes different kinds of motion, ranging from the
perception of objects moving in the world to the conception of
movement implied in action verbs. The lateral occipital –
temporal cortex mediates the perceptual and conceptual
features of action events, similar to the way that the ventral
occipital – temporal cortex processes the perceptual and
conceptual features of entities. &

facts or inanimate objects (Tranel et al., 1997; Sacchett
& Humphreys, 1992; Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Warrington & McCarthy, 1983). Functional neuroimaging has
provided converging evidence that distinct neural networks represent living things and man-made artifacts,
using animals and tools as examples of each category
(Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999; Perani et al., 1999;
Cappa, Perani, Schnur, Tettamanti, & Fazio, 1998; Damasio, Grabowski, Tranel, Hichwa, & Damasio, 1996;
Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1996). A common
explanation for these results is that knowledge of
animate and inanimate objects incorporates different
features of those objects (Saffran & Schwartz, 1994).
Knowledge of animate objects depends more on visual
features such as shape and color, while knowledge of
inanimate objects depends more on functional features
such as characteristic uses. According to this view,
distinct neural structures are not specialized for processing different semantic categories on their own,
rather they are specialized for processing particular
features (such as color or shape) which might be more
critical for knowledge of particular semantic categories
(although see Caramazza & Shelton, 1998 for an opposing view).
Despite the wealth of research on how the brain
represents different categories of concrete entities, less
attention has been given to the more basic distinction
between entities and events. Some patients with brain
damage may have selective difficulty in naming pictures
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 14:5, pp. 795 – 805

of actions in comparison to pictures of objects, while
others may have object-naming deficits with spared
action naming (Berndt, Haendiges, Mitchum, & Sandson, 1997; Berndt, Mitchum, Haendiges, & Sandson,
1997; Silveri & Di Betta, 1997; Daniele, Giustolisi, Silveri,
Colosimo, & Gainotti, 1994; Damasio & Tranel, 1993;
McCarthy & Warrington, 1985). For at least some of
these patients, the deficit may be at the conceptual level,
rather than simply one of lexical retrieval (Silveri & Di
Betta, 1997; Daniele et al., 1994; McCarthy & Warrington, 1985). Conceptual deficits for event knowledge
have also been demonstrated within a subset of agrammatic aphasic patients who demonstrate difficulties with

Figure 1. Schematic of the
experimental paradigm.
(a) Conceptual matching
task with pictures and
corresponding baseline task.
(b) Conceptual matching task
with words and corresponding
baseline task.

understanding thematic relations in sentences (Chatterjee, Southwood, Calhoun, & Thompson, 1999). Behavioral data suggest that knowledge of action events
incorporates spatial features similar to the way that
knowledge of entities might incorporate features of
shape or color or functional uses (Chatterjee, Maher,
Gonzalez Rothi, & Heilman, 1995; Chatterjee, Maher, &
Heilman, 1995; Chatterjee, Southwood, & Basilico, 1999;
Maher, Chatterjee, Gonzalez Rothi, & Heilman, 1995),
and linguists have made a similar argument on theoretical grounds (Talmy, 1996; Jackendoff, 1990). However,
the neural substrate mediating this knowledge of events
is not well understood.
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A consideration of the spatial features of action events
suggests several hypotheses about cortical regions more
important for the knowledge of events than entities.
Events, unlike entities, often involve motion through
space and may form a conceptual category where linguistic and spatial representations make contact (Chatterjee, 2001). One hypothesis is that action concepts
depend on motion features represented by visual motion areas (MT/MST). A second hypothesis is that action
concepts involve spatial maps represented by the parietal cortex. The third hypothesis is that action concepts
(because they can involve self-movement) engage motor
engrams represented by the motor and premotor cortex. Finally, it is possible that the conceptual distinction
between objects and actions is not realized at a largescale neural level.
The available evidence bearing on these hypotheses is
not conclusive. In a large series of brain-damaged
patients, action-naming deficits were most often associated with left inferior frontal or left lateral occipital –
temporal lesions (Kemmerer & Tranel, 2000). Some
investigators have found that left prefrontal damage
specifically impairs action naming more than object
naming (Daniele et al., 1994; Damasio & Tranel, 1993),
although others have disputed this claim (Tyler, Russell,
Fadili, & Moss, 2001; Bird, Howard, & Franklin, 2000). In
a recent PET study, action naming produced greater
activity than tool naming in bilateral occipital – temporal
cortex near the location of human MT/MST (Damasio
et al., 2001). Thus, studies of action naming provide
some support for the ‘‘motor’’ and ‘‘motion’’ hypotheses, although interpretation of these studies is complicated by the fact that naming requires lexical retrieval
processes as well as access to conceptual knowledge. In
contrast, Tyler et al. (2001) found no differences between nouns and verbs in a recent PET study. Using a
lexical decision and a semantic categorization task, they
found robust activation extending from the left inferior
frontal cortex to the inferior temporal lobe, but they did
not find any differences as a function of word class.
Consequently, they propose that conceptual knowledge
is represented in distributed neural systems, but that
this knowledge is not differentiated by conceptual category within these networks.
We used functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) to investigate the various hypotheses about
cortical regions preferentially involved in the conceptual knowledge of actions over objects. Two groups of
subjects performed a matching task with line drawings
(Figure 1). This task required subjects to access conceptual knowledge about objects and actions, with
minimal demands on lexical retrieval processes. Three
pictures were presented simultaneously, and subjects
decided which of two pictures at the bottom of the
stimulus was most related to the one at the top. In
different blocks of the trials, the pictures were of
objects or actions (Figure 1a). If action concepts are

preferentially mediated by premotor, parietal, or posterior temporal areas, then these areas should show more
activity during matching action pictures than matching
object pictures.
The second group of subjects also performed the
same matching task with words instead of pictures
(Figure 1b). In this case, the object words were nouns
and the action words were verbs. The word-matching
task allowed us to test for differences in activity depending on whether conceptual knowledge of actions was
accessed by pictures or by words. If conceptual knowledge of actions is not material-specific (pictures vs.
words), then areas involved in action picture matching
should also be more active during verb matching than
during noun matching. These tasks also allowed us to
test for areas involved in making conceptual judgments,
irrespective of conceptual category (objects or actions)
or material (pictures or words).

RESULTS
Behavioral Results
For the first group of 5 subjects, there was no significant
difference between object and action picture matching
in either accuracy or reaction time (82 ± 4% and 1541
±78 msec for objects, 78 ± 3% and 1636 ± 89 msec for
actions). For the second group of 6 subjects, there was
no significant difference in accuracy between object and
action picture matching (79 ± 2% for objects and 76 ±
4% for actions), but reaction times for action matching
were slower [1516 ± 50 msec for objects and 1720 ± 80
msec for actions, t(5) = 2.9, p = .03]. For this group,
there were also no significant differences in either
accuracy or reaction time for word matching (87 ± 4%
and 1495 ± 69 msec for nouns and 91 ± 3% and 1469 ±
65 msec for verbs).

Imaging Results
We conducted all of our analyses of the imaging data in
each individual subject without normalization to a common space, and then tested whether the effects obtained in individual subjects were consistent across a
group of subjects (see Methods). Our first group of five
subjects performed the conceptual matching task with
pictures. In comparison to the baseline task, conceptual
matching of object or action pictures activated bilateral
areas in the inferior frontal, premotor, inferior parietal,
inferior temporal and occipital, and lateral temporal
cortical areas in most of the subjects. Of these regions,
the only areas that showed greater activation for actions
than objects were lateral occipital – temporal regions
near the location of human MT/MST.
To directly test the hypothesis that the MT/MST was
involved, we identified the MT/MST in each of 6
subjects in a second group using a localizer scan
Kable, Lease-Spellmeyer, and Chatterjee
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with pictures. Activity in the MT/MST bilaterally was
indeed consistently greater for matching action pictures than matching object pictures across subjects,
whether considering all voxels in the MT/MST [t(5) =
4.6, p < .01] or just those voxels with a significant
main effect for the picture matching task (objects and
actions) compared to baseline [t(5) = 3.6, p = .02,
Figure 2a – b]. There was no correlation between the
size of this effect and the size of the MT/MST across
subjects (R2 = .19).
To determine if other regions were differentially
active for object or action picture matching, we defined
5 bilateral anatomical regions-of-interest (ROIs) based
on the results in the first 5 subjects: inferior frontal gyri
(Brodmann’s areas 44, 45, and 47), premotor cortex

Figure 2. Brain areas showing greater activity during matching action
pictures than during matching object pictures. In all anatomical
images, the left side of the brain is shown on the left. (a) Three slices
from a representative subject (WM) showing the location of voxels in
the MT/MST with a significant main effect for picture matching (objects
and actions) as compared to baseline ( p < .05, one-tailed, corrected
for multiple comparisons within ROI). Functional data are overlaid on
T1 anatomical images. Active voxels are shown in yellow, and the ROI is
outlined in white. (b) Data, averaged across the voxels in (a), showing
greater activity during conceptual matching of action pictures. Solid
lines indicate time course of MR signal and dashed lines indicate the fit
of object- and action-matching covariates. Task blocks are labeled:
A = action picture matching, B = baseline task, O = object picture
matching. Data are filtered to remove low-frequency drift. (c) Average
effect size across subjects (n = 6) for the action picture matching
minus object matching comparison in different ROIs. Error bars
represent the standard error of the mean. The numbers in parentheses
are the average number of voxels in each ROI considered for this
analysis (those significant for the main effect of picture matching
minus baseline). Asterisks indicate that effect size is significantly
different from zero ( p < .05, two-tailed). ROIs are bilateral.

(see Methods) (Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000; Tootell,
Reppas, Kwong et al., 1995). We successfully identified
the MT/MST in both the right and the left hemispheres
in all 6 subjects. The MT/MST was consistently located
near the lateral extent of the occipital lobe (posterior
to the anterior occipital sulcus) at the level of the
lateral occipital sulcus, which separates the inferior
and superior parts of the middle occipital gyrus. The
average size of the MT/MST was 25 ± 5 voxels in the
right hemisphere (range: 10 – 36) and 12 ± 3 voxels in
the left hemisphere (range: 2 –24 voxels). These subjects also performed the conceptual matching task
798
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Figure 3. Brain area showing greater activity during matching action
words (verbs) than during matching object words (nouns). (a – b) Data
from a representative subject ( JS) showing greater activity in the lateral
posterior temporal cortex during conceptual matching of verbs. Same
format as in Figure 2a – b. (c) Average effect size across subjects (n = 6)
for the verb matching minus noun matching comparison in different
ROIs. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. The
numbers in parentheses are the average number of voxels in each ROI
considered for this analysis (those significant for the main effect of
word matching minus baseline). Asterisk indicates that effect size is
significantly different from zero ( p < .05, two-tailed). Since no voxels
in the MT/MST in any subject were significant for the main effect of
word matching minus baseline, effect sizes in the MT/MST are shown
for voxels that were significant for the main effect of picture matching
minus baseline (for direct comparison to Figure 2). All other ROIs are
restricted to the left hemisphere.

Volume 14, Number 5

Figure 4. Brain areas showing
significant activation during
both the picture-matching and
word-matching tasks. One slice
from each of three subjects is
presented, showing the location
of voxels that were significantly
active for both the picture
matching (objects and actions)
as compared to the baseline
comparison and the word
matching (nouns and verbs)
as compared to the baseline
comparison (both p < .05,
one-tailed, corrected for
multiple comparisons).

(Brodmann’s area 6), fusiform gyrus, posterior middle
and superior temporal gyri, and inferior parietal cortex
(Brodmann’s areas 39 and 40). In each ROI, we identified voxels within each subject that had significantly
greater activity during the conceptual task (collapsing
across object and action matching) compared to the
baseline task. Combining data from all the active voxels
within an ROI, we then examined the difference between action and object matching and tested whether
this difference was consistent across subjects. Using this
analysis, the only significant difference was in the
posterior lateral temporal regions bilaterally, where
activity was consistently greater for matching action
pictures than matching objects [t(5) = 3.6, p = .02,
Figure 2c].
These subjects also performed the conceptual
matching task with words instead of pictures. In
contrast to the picture version, there was no consistent difference in MT/MST activity between verb and
noun matching across subjects, when considering all
voxels in the MT/MST. In addition, there were no
voxels in the MT/MST in any subject that were significant for the main effect of word matching (nouns and
verbs) minus baseline. We also performed an ROI analysis to identify areas that showed differential activity for
noun or verb matching. Since few voxels in the right
hemisphere were active in the word-matching task, we
only considered the left hemisphere in each ROI
(although statistical results did not differ if the right
hemisphere was included). Similar to the picture version, voxels in the posterior lateral temporal cortex
showed consistently greater activity during verb matching compared to noun matching across subjects [t(5) =

3.1, p = .03, Figure 3]. In 2 of 6 subjects, there was an
overlap of the voxels considered for this analysis in the
lateral temporal cortex across the picture and word
versions of the task. For the remaining subjects, the
voxels considered in the word version were located
anterior and dorsal to the ones considered in the
picture version, in the posterior part of the middle
and superior temporal gyri. Again, similar to the picture
version, no other region showed differential activity for
nouns or verbs.
Finally, in each subject, we searched for voxels that
were significantly active in both the picture and word
versions, collapsing across conceptual category (objects
and actions). We tested whether any voxels passed the
joint hypothesis tests for greater activity during object
and action picture matching as compared to baseline
and for greater activity during noun and verb matching
as compared to baseline. Using this test, we found
significant voxels in the left posterior prefrontal cortex
in five of six subjects (11 ± 4 voxels, range: 2– 20 voxels)
and in the left fusiform gyrus (4 ± 1 voxels, range: 1 –9
voxels) in a different 5 of 6 subjects (Figure 4). We did
not find significant voxels in any other region in a
majority of subjects. Within the voxels that were jointly
significant in the left fusiform, the effect size was larger
in the picture-matching scan for all subjects.

DISCUSSION
The main purpose of this study was to establish that the
neural mediation of the conceptual category of events
differs from that of entities in the normal human brain.
We found that conceptual matching of actions caused
Kable, Lease-Spellmeyer, and Chatterjee
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greater activation in areas of the lateral occipital –
temporal cortex. When subjects matched action pictures, in comparison to objects, there was greater
activity in human MT/MST bilaterally. When subjects
matched action words (verbs), in comparison to object
words (nouns), there was greater activity anterior and
dorsal to the MT/MST on the left, within the posterior
aspect of the middle and superior temporal gyri. In
contrast, we found no evidence for greater activity
during action matching in either prefrontal or parietal
regions. Finally, areas in the left posterior prefrontal
cortex and the left fusiform gyrus were activated across
both the picture- and word-matching tasks, irrespective
of the category of stimuli (objects or actions).
The greater activation for action than object matching
in the MT/MST and adjoining regions in the posterior
temporal lobe is consistent with the idea that conceptual
knowledge of actions incorporates motion features.
Furthermore, the pattern of action-specific activations
suggests a mosaic of cortical areas that processes different senses of motion, from the visual association cortex
(more perceptual) to the perisylvian regions (more
linguistic). Action-specific activations in the picturematching task primarily centered on the MT/MST,
extending into the middle temporal gyrus, while actionspecific activations in the word-matching task were
dorsal and anterior to those in the picture task, across
both the middle and superior temporal gyri.
Other findings provide converging support for a
mosaic of regions processing different kinds of motion
along the lateral occipital– temporal surface. Naming
actions that involve an implement produces more
activity bilaterally near the MT/MST than does naming
implements (Damasio et al., 2001), and lesions in a
similar area of the left hemisphere are associated with
action-naming deficits (Kemmerer & Tranel, 2000). In
addition, generating a corresponding verb in response
to an object picture produces more activity than generating a corresponding color name in the left posterior
temporal regions anterior to the MT/MST (Martin,
Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995). When
the stimulus is a word instead of a picture, verb
generation produces activation that extends more anteriorly into perisylvian regions (Martin et al., 1995).
Finally, imagining actions (compared to a passive baseline) activates parts of the lateral temporal cortex, as
does observing semantically meaningful actions (compared to meaningless actions) (Ruby & Decety, 2001;
Decety et al., 1997).
Converging support can also be found in previous
findings concerning the neural basis of conceptual
knowledge of concrete entities. Naming or viewing
pictures of tools, in comparison to animal pictures,
consistently activates portions of the left posterior temporal cortex (Chao et al., 1999; Damasio et al., 1996;
Martin et al., 1996). This tool-specific activation is also
present in verbal tasks in which no pictures are pre800
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sented (Chao et al., 1999; Perani et al., 1999; Cappa et al.,
1998). Lesions in this area of the inferior temporal gyrus
are associated with deficits in tool naming as well as
retrieval of conceptual knowledge about tools (Tranel
et al., 1997; Damasio et al., 1996). Since characteristic
motions may be more important for tool concepts than
animal concepts, these results are consistent with the
idea that conceptual categories that incorporate motion recruit posterior temporal cortices.
Our findings also provide additional insight into the
functional significance of MT/MST activity, which may
occur in the absence of moving stimuli. For example,
MT/MST activity increases when subjects perceive motion in illusions or when they imagine a moving stimulus
(Goebel, Khorram-Sefat, Muckli, Hacker, & Singer, 1998;
Tootell, Reppas, Dale et al., 1995; Zeki, Watson, &
Frackowiak, 1993). Still pictures with implied motion
(e.g., athletes, natural scenes, or objects in motion) also
activate the MT/MST (Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000; Senior
et al., 2000). However, none of these tasks explicitly
involve semantics. Our results are consistent with the
interpretation that activity in the MT/MST can be modulated by high-level inferences about stimuli (such as
conceptual categorization), as suggested by Kourtzi &
Kanwisher (2000).
Our failure to find greater activity in either the prefrontal or the parietal cortex during action matching
with either pictures or words does not support the idea
that the semantics of actions are preferentially mediated
by these areas. How can this finding be reconciled with
the action-naming deficits found in patients with left
frontal brain damage (Kemmerer & Tranel, 2000; Daniele et al., 1994; Damasio & Tranel, 1993)? One possibility is that these action-naming deficits result from
lexical rather than semantic or conceptual factors. Bird
et al. (2000) recently demonstrated that action-naming
deficits were no longer evident in their patients when
concreteness was balanced across objects and actions.
Alternatively, verbs play a more crucial role than nouns
in syntax. Left prefrontal regions may be important in
using verbs to establish a syntactic frame (Chatterjee &
Maher, 2000). Since our task did not involve syntactic
structures explicitly, perhaps the prefrontal cortex was
not preferentially activated.
Furthermore, our data do not support the proposal of
Tyler et al. (2001) that conceptual knowledge is represented within nondifferentiated distributed neural networks. The stimuli in their study were divided along
grammatical class rather than conceptual category, and
included both abstract and concrete words. Sensorimotor features, such as motion or form, are not likely to be
as critical for the concepts embodied by abstract nouns
or verbs. In addition, there was variability across subjects in the location of the activations we found in
the lateral temporal cortex in the word-matching task.
Because PET data from different subjects must be
combined within a normalized reference frame, PET
Volume 14, Number 5

may be less sensitive than fMRI to detect the changes we
found.
We found no evidence for greater activity in any
cortical region during object matching than action
matching. However, in the picture version of the task,
all of the action stimuli included objects. Similarly, in the
word version of the task, semantic processing of an
action word may automatically evoke references to
objects participating in those actions. The most likely
candidate for a region important for object knowledge is
the ventral surface of the temporal lobe. If this region is
object-specific, then the category-specific activity demonstrated in this region (Chao et al., 1999; Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin, Schouten, & Haxby, 1999; Aguirre,
Zarahn, & D’Esposito, 1998a; Epstein & Kanwisher,
1998; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; McCarthy,
Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997) should be insensitive to
whether the object is participating in an action or not.
While the MT/MST and the posterior temporal areas
were preferentially activated by action matching, the left
posterior prefrontal cortex and the left fusiform gyrus
were activated by the semantic-matching task regardless
of the conceptual category (objects or actions) or the
material (pictures or words). Many previous findings
have implicated these two regions in language or semantic processing (Tyler et al., 2001; Gabrieli, Poldrack, &
Desmond, 1998; Binder et al., 1997; Vandenberghe, Price,
Wise, Josephs, & Frackowiak, 1996; Luders et al., 1991;
Burnstine et al., 1990). Using PET, Vandenberghe et al.
(1996) found that the same two areas were activated in
both the picture and word versions of a similar objectmatching task. Our results replicate their finding for
objects and demonstrate that similar activation occurs
more generally across semantic domains, including actions. The effect size within the left posterior prefrontal
cortex was similar for the picture and word versions, a
pattern suggesting that this region plays a more general
role in semantic processing. Recent fMRI and patient
studies suggest that left prefrontal regions have a
role in selecting information from semantic memory
(Thompson-Schill, D’Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997;
Thompson-Schill et al., 1998; Thompson-Schill, D’Esposito, & Kan, 1999). Since selection demands should be
similar across the picture and word versions of the
matching task, our results are consistent with this
hypothesis. In contrast, the effect size within the left
fusiform gyrus was greater during the picture version of
the task, a pattern that suggests that this region plays a
greater role in visual representations. The activation in
the fusiform was close to regions implicated in categoryspecific visual representations of objects (sometimes
referred to as structural descriptions) (Chao et al.,
1999; Ishai et al., 1999; Aguirre et al., 1998a; Epstein &
Kanwisher, 1998; Kanwisher et al., 1997; McCarthy et al.,
1997). Since it may be hard to consider actions in the
absence of objects involved in the actions, this area may
remain active across all versions of the matching task.

While the left posterior prefrontal and the left fusiform activations were present in both the picture- and
word-matching tasks, the general pattern of activation
diverged across the two versions of the task. As
discussed above, the action-specific voxels in picture
and word versions did not overlap in all subjects. In
addition, activations in picture matching were bilateral
in all subjects, while activations in word matching
were predominantly left lateralized. Chatterjee (2001)
recently proposed that the right hemisphere might be
more involved in representing or interpreting specific
imagistic instances of a concept (a particular picture),
while the left hemisphere might be more involved in
representing or interpreting prototypical instances of
a concept (a word or schematic that could apply to
a number of pictures). Our data are consistent with
this proposal.
In summary, while left prefrontal regions were robustly activated in all conditions in the present study,
activity in the posterior cortex diverged across the different conceptual category (objects or actions) and material (pictures or words) manipulations. In particular, parts
of the lateral occipital – temporal cortex, including the
MT/MST, were differentially activated when subjects
accessed their conceptual knowledge of actions through
pictures or words. These results are consistent with the
hypotheses that knowledge of events incorporates motion features. Much previous work in the cognitive
neuroscience of semantic memory has stressed the
importance of a mosaic of regions within the ventral
occipital – temporal surface, which processes different
perceptual and conceptual features of objects. The
current study suggests the existence of another mosaic
of regions within the lateral occipital –temporal surface,
which processes perceptual and conceptual features of
motion, including the perception of moving objects, the
implied motion in action pictures, and the implied
motion of action verbs.

METHODS
Subjects
Two men and 3 women from the university community
participated in Experiment 1 (mean age = 22.2 years).
Three men and 3 women subjects participated in
Experiment 2 (mean age = 20.7 years). All subjects
were right-handed and English was their only language
before school age. None had a history of neurologic
or psychiatric symptoms. All subjects gave informed
consent in accordance with the procedures of the
University of Pennsylvania.

Behavioral Task and Design
During a scan, subjects performed a conceptual matching task similar to the Pyramids and Palm Trees task
Kable, Lease-Spellmeyer, and Chatterjee
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(Howard & Patterson, 1992). On each trial, a target
stimulus was presented at the top of the screen and
two choice stimuli were presented at the bottom. Subjects indicated which of the choices matched the target
with a button press (right or left hand). On experimental
trials, the correct choice was semantically linked to the
target. For example, ‘‘leaf’’ matched with ‘‘flower’’ rather
than ‘‘mushroom,’’ or ‘‘following’’ matched with ‘‘trailing’’ rather than ‘‘slicing.’’ In baseline trials, the stimuli
were distorted forms (distorted versions of pictures
used in the experimental condition), and subjects indicated which of the choices was the same as the target
(Figure 1). A perceptual task was used instead of a
resting baseline because of previous evidence that brain
regions involved in conceptual processing are active
during ‘‘rest’’ (Binder et al., 1999).
The second group of subjects performed two versions
of the conceptual matching task, one with picture
stimuli and one with corresponding word stimuli. The
first group of subjects performed only the picture version. In all cases, experimental and baseline trials were
presented in alternating blocks of 20 sec. Each block
consisted of a 2-sec instruction and six trials of 3 sec
each. Further, experimental blocks alternated between
object stimuli and action stimuli. The order of object and
action blocks, as well as picture- and word-version scans,
was counterbalanced across subjects.
Picture triads were adapted from the Florida Semantics
Battery (Raymer & Gonzalez Rothi, 2000). Thirty object
stimuli and 30 action stimuli were selected through pilot
testing such that normal subjects responded with similar
accuracy and reaction time. We chose to equate stimuli
on accuracy and reaction time, as opposed to other
possible variables, such as visual complexity, since performance parameters seemed more directly linked to
brain activity. Equal numbers of left and right matches
were chosen in each condition, and no individual pictures were repeated.
Word triads were constructed by substituting an appropriate name for each picture. Object and action
words did not differ in either frequency or regularity
of words. Because many English words can refer to
objects or actions, all action words were presented in
the present participle form, ending in ‘‘-ing.’’ Although
such a consistent ending might create a potential confound (by making action words longer, for instance), we
felt it was necessary to ensure that subjects understood
the words as clearly referring to actions.
Baseline triads were created by distorting picture or
word stimuli with the ‘‘ripple’’ and ‘‘wave’’ filters in
Adobe Photoshop, and replacing the distorted match
with the distorted target (see Figure 1 for examples).
Baseline stimuli were the same size as experimental
stimuli and contained limited shape information, but
lacked any information about object parts or letters.
Baseline stimuli were pilot tested to ensure that none of
the distorted pictures or words were recognizable.
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Subjects were familiarized with the tasks before the
scanning session. During the scanning session, stimuli
were back-projected onto a screen at the foot of the
subject gurney and subjects viewed the stimuli
through a mirror mounted on the head coil. Stimulus
presentation and recording of responses were controlled by Psyscope software (psyscope.psy.cmu.edu)
for the language tasks and Pixx software (psychology.
concordia.ca/department/CVLab/CVLab.html) for the
visual motion task.
MRI Acquisition
BOLD-sensitive, T2*-weighted fMRI data were acquired
using a gradient-echo, echo-planar pulse sequence on a
1.5-T GE signa scanner (TR = 2000 msec, TEeff = 50 msec,
flip angle = 908, 64  64 matrix in a 24-cm field of view,
resulting in 3.75 by 3.75 mm within slice resolution).
The scanner was equipped with a quadrature radiofrequency head coil and a prototype fast gradient system. Head motion was minimized using foam padding.
Data were acquired in twenty-one 5-mm axial slices,
covering the entire cortex but omitting lower portions
of the cerebellum and brainstem. Subjects performed
no task during the first 20 sec of each scan as steadystate magnetization was achieved. Subjects completed
each version of the task in one 7-min scan, resulting in
200 observations per voxel per subject. High-resolution,
T1-weighted axial and sagittal scans were also acquired for
each subject using a spin-echo sequence (TR = 600 msec,
TE = 14 msec, 192  256 matrix).
Data Analysis
Data processing was performed using software developed at the University of Pennsylvania (www.voxbo.org).
Before statistical analysis, data were corrected for staggered slice acquisition by sinc-interpolation in time,
realigned to the first image acquired for each subject
using a six-parameter motion-correction algorithm, and
thresholded to exclude extra-parenchymal voxels from
subsequent analyses. No spatial smoothing or normalization to a common space was performed.
Voxel-wise analysis within each subject was performed
using a general linear model for serially correlated error
terms. Included in this model were covariates modeling
different task components (e.g., ‘‘object matching’’ or
‘‘action matching’’), an estimate of the intrinsic temporal
autocorrelation, and sine and cosine regressors for
frequencies below those of the task. Task covariates
were boxcar waveforms convolved with an estimate of
the BOLD hemodynamic transfer function empirically
derived from the motor cortex in a large group of
subjects (Aguirre, Zarahn, & D’Esposito, 1998b). To
improve specificity, data were also smoothed in time
with the hemodynamic transfer function. This method
has been empirically demonstrated to control the
Volume 14, Number 5

map-wise false-positive rate (Aguirre, Zarahn, & D’Esposito, 1997; Zarahn, Aguirre, & D’Esposito, 1997).
Group analyses focused on identifying regions of the
brain where activity differed significantly between object
and action conditions. Group analyses were performed
as random-effects models, rather than fixed-effects models, so that the results could be generalized from the
sample to the population (Woods, 1996). Initially, voxels
were identified within each subject where activity was
significant for the main effect of experimental (objects
plus actions) compared to baseline conditions ( p < .05,
corrected for multiple comparisons within an ROI). This
main effect contrast would detect voxels that were
significantly active in either the object or the action
conditions compared to the baseline condition (one
exception is discussed below). Then, the fMRI time
series was averaged for all significant voxels within a
defined ROI in each subject. Next, a measure of the
effect size for the orthogonal contrast of actions minus
objects was extracted from the averaged ROI time series
in each subject. We used t values as a measure of effect
size rather than percent signal change, because the
residual error term in the denominator of the t value
most effectively corrects the effect size for scaling effects
due to differences in overall MR signal intensity across
scanning sessions (Postle, Zarahn, & D’Esposito, 2000).
Finally, paired t tests addressed whether this effect was
consistently greater for objects or actions in that ROI
across subjects. Thus, a significant difference in this
random-effects analysis indicates that activity in that
ROI was consistently greater for actions compared to
objects across subjects (for example), but merits no
conclusion as to whether that region was exclusively
active in only one condition compared to the baseline.
The above group analysis can detect effects that are
reliable across subjects, but may be too subtle to detect at
the voxel level in an individual subject. Thus, the logic of
this analysis is similar to a random-effects analysis at the
voxel level after normalizing and smoothing each subject’s data. However, this analysis compares favorably to a
random-effects analysis at the voxel level in two ways.
First, by reducing the effect size in each ROI to one value,
this analysis avoids the need to correct for multiple
comparisons across voxels, increasing sensitivity. Second, because the voxels being compared across subjects
are defined functionally by the main effect comparison,
this analysis avoids the assumption that brain areas in the
same coordinates of normalized space are functionally
homologous across subjects, as well as the assumption
that all voxels within an ROI are homologous. This point
is particularly critical when considering the temporal
cortex, where large subject-to-subject variability in the
location of activations has previously been reported
(Thompson-Schill et al., 1999). One drawback of this
analysis, in comparison to a random-effects analysis at
the voxel level, is the loss of spatial resolution that results
from averaging across all active voxels within an ROI.

This analysis would miss differences occurring in
voxels that do not show a significant main effect. For
example, activity within a voxel might be greatest for
action matching, intermediate for the baseline task, and
least for object matching, such that there was no main
effect for object and action matching compared to the
baseline. However, such a pattern of activity would be
peculiar, because it would imply that a given region
responds positively to one semantic task compared to
the baseline, and negatively to the other semantic task
compared to the baseline. Such a pattern would be
detected by a direct contrast between the action and
object conditions for both the word and picture versions. The results of these direct contrasts did not
change the interpretation of our main-effects analyses.
ROIs were defined by either anatomical or functional
criteria. The locations of anatomical ROIs were chosen
on the basis of a priori hypotheses, as well as the results
seen in the first group of subjects. Anatomical ROIs
were traced on each subject’s high-resolution, T1weighted image according to the following boundaries,
including both gray and white matter. The inferior
frontal ROI included the pars triangularis, pars opercularis, and pars orbitalis, corresponding to Brodmann’s
areas 44, 45, and 47 (362 ± 32 voxels bilaterally). The
premotor cortex ROI corresponded to Brodmann’s area
6, which includes the posterior half of the superior
frontal gyrus medially and the cortex surrounding the
precentral sulcus laterally (973 ± 86 voxels). The fusiform ROI included both the occipital and temporal
portions of this gyrus (338 ± 26 voxels). The posterior
temporal ROI included the posterior two-thirds of the
middle and superior temporal gyri (873 ± 54 voxels).
The inferior parietal ROI included the angular and
supramarginal gyri, corresponding to Brodmann’s areas
39 and 40 (729 ± 50 voxels).
To functionally identify the visual motion cortex, subjects participated in a separate localizer scan. In this scan,
subjects viewed alternating 16-sec blocks of radially
moving dots and stationary dots. The radially moving
dots alternated between inward and outward motion
every 2 sec. In accordance with previous studies, the
visual motion cortex was defined as all contiguous voxels
in the lateral occipital – temporal cortex with significantly
greater activity during presentation of moving dots
(Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000; Tootell, Reppas, Kwong
et al., 1995). The region identified by this contrast
appears to be the human homologue of motion-sensitive
cortical areas in the macaque, including the MT and the
MST (Tootell, Reppas, Kwong, et al., 1995).
For the second group of subjects, we also identified
voxels that had significantly greater activity during conceptual matching in both the picture and word versions
of the experiment ( p < .05, corrected for multiple
comparisons, for both the main effect of picture matching minus baseline and the main effect of word matching
minus baseline).
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